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Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania signed the Treaty of Understanding and 
Cooperation in Geneva on 12 September 1934. The treaty prescribed regu-
lar meetings at the level of foreign ministers. Over the course of six years 
(1934–40), eleven trilateral meetings of foreign ministers took place. At 
these, political issues of common interest were discussed and, as a rule, 
opinions on international negotiations and prospective treaties as well as 
joint positions under the League of Nations were coordinated. The conclu-
sion of the treaty was a starting point for further collaboration between the 
official institutions of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In addition, meetings 
of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (those of journalists, lawyers, 
economists, university students, teachers, trade institutions, local govern-
ments, firemen, etc.) of the three countries, as well as joint art exhibitions 
and sports competitions (so-called Baltic Weeks), were held on a regular 
basis in the 1930s. The activities of the NGOs were supported by the gov-
ernments of the Baltic states. “The need for close cooperation between the 
Baltic states is the cornerstone of our foreign policy,” was stated in the 
review of the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Estonia in 1934.1 
The treaty itself and the tight collaboration in the 1930s confirmed the 
image of Baltic unity in the eyes of outsiders. In the cataclysmic years of 
1939–40, it therefore appeared to the big countries in Europe (United King-
dom, France, Germany, the Soviet Union) rather natural that the destiny 
of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania would be determined by some common 
settlement. The Baltic states were seen as joint players, especially when 
guarantees for their integrity were discussed during the meetings between 
the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union in the summer of 1939. 
After the Soviet annexation, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania continued to 
be perceived (even in Moscow) as a unified political, economic, or cul-
tural entity within the Soviet Union, not to mention the relatively close 
1  Valitsusasutiste tegevus 1918–34. Välisministeerium (Tallinn: Riigikantselei, Riigi 
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cooperation between refugees from these countries in exile.2 Emphasiz-
ing Baltic unity was an important political factor in the Cold War context. 
Those who publicly expressed their doubts about the existence of a united 
Baltic region were very few.3
When we look at the topic from the point of view of international rela-
tions, the Baltic Entente was not at all as effective as described above. What 
is most important, and what we should not to forget, is that the Baltic 
Entente is normally not ranked among defence pacts, although in some 
cases it has been.4 In this regard, it is not unequivocally clear what mili-
tary alliance means in the first place. If we evaluate the Baltic Entente on 
the basis of an ambiguous definition such as “arrangements for security 
cooperation among states”, it may be asserted that the Baltic Entente was 
indeed expected to enhance security in the 1930s, and the option of a mili-
tary alliance was also considered in the negotiations of 1933–34. However, if 
we define the concept of a military alliance in more detail, as actual mili-
tary cooperation between the states, the Baltic Entente would fall outside 
that category.5 In the second half of the 1930s, the upgrading of the Baltic 
Entente into a military pact remained a purely theoretical option rather 
than one of practical politics. The same issue has been thoroughly ana-
lyzed by several historians. In Soviet historiography, the Baltic Entente was 
regarded as an example of foreign policy that was hostile towards the Soviet 
Union,6 or even as being in the service of German imperialism.7 After the 
2   Regional identity under Soviet rule: the case of the Baltic states, ed. by Dietrich André 
Loeber, Vytas Stanley Vardys, Laurence Patrick, Anthony Kitching (Hackettstown, NJ: 
Ass. for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, 1990).
3   Hain Rebas, “Baltic Regionalism?” Regional identity under Soviet rule: the case of the 
Baltic states, ed. by Dietrich André Loeber, Vytas Stanley Vardys, Laurence Patrick, 
Anthony Kitching (Hackettstown, NJ: Ass. for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, 
1990), 413–428.
4   “Baltic Entente”, Encyclopedia Britannica, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/
topic/50936/Baltic-Entente> (15.6.2012).
5   Stefan Bergsmann, “The concept of military alliance”, Small states and alliances, ed. 
by Erich Reiter and Heinz Gärtner (Heidelberg, New York: Physica-Verlag, 2001), 25 –37.
6   Heino Arumäe, Kahe ilma piiril: võitlusest Balti riikide julgeoleku ümber 1933. 1935. ja 
1939. aastal (Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1979); Heino Arumäe, At the crossroads: the foreign 
policy of the Republic of Estonia in 1933–1939 (Tallinn: Perioodika, Ühiselu, 1983); Heino 
Arumäe, Võitlus Balti liidu loomise ümber, 1919–1925 (Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1983). 
7   Madis Pesti, Rahvuslik reetmine “rahvusluse” sildi all: kodanliku Eesti välispoliitikast 
aastail 1934–1940 (Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1960); Peeter Vihalem, Eesti kodanluse 
üleminek saksa fašismi teenistusse (Tallinn: Eesti Raamat, 1971); Ilo Sildmäe, Fašistlik eesti 
kodanlus imperialistliku agressiooni teenistuses Nõukogudevastase sõja ette valmistamisel 
(1934–1940) (Tallinn: Eesti Riiklik Kirjastus, 1954); Eesti riik ja rahvas II maailmasõjas, 
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regaining of independence, the circumstances relating to the establish-
ment and subsequent activity of the Baltic Entente have been analyzed by 
Latvian historians.8 
This article studies the different explanations that have been used to 
generalize the essence of the Baltic alliance and to characterize the coop-
eration between the countries around the Baltic Sea. The differences lie 
primarily in emphases when answering questions like the following: To 
what extent and by what arguments have Estonia’s, Latvia’s, and Lithuania’s 
belonging to some independent, united entity been justified? Do we have 
any grounds for talking about generally recognized, understandable-to-
all characteristics that are common to the Baltic states? 
Small states and major powers 
Trying to answer questions like that, I will limit the analysis to one approach 
in this article. The most common is the way of explanation that proceeds 
from national interests – what I call a traditional explanation in this arti-
cle. The objective is not to recapitulate all lines of thought in international 
relations, not even in terms of how they have specifically assessed the role 
of the Baltic states in international relations. As a rule, general theoreti-
cal studies, textbooks, manuals and other publications dealing with the 
schools of thought in the field of international relations make no case of 
the Baltic states whatsoever.9 Nevertheless, numerous articles and article 
collections can be found that are devoted either specifically to the Baltic 
states or the issues of the Baltic Sea region, though primarily following the 
regaining of independence.10 
Occasionally, one can find in such publications attempts to general-
ize the experience of small states in international relations based on the 
example of the Baltic states. For instance, a collection compiled by Olaf F. 
Knudsen mentions two theories that enable the explanation of the problems 
8   Inesis Feldmanis, Aivars Stranga, The destiny of the Baltic Entente 1934–1940 (Riga: 
Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 1994).
9   Small states in world politics: explaining foreign policy behavior, ed. by Jeanne A. K. 
Hey (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003); The role of small states in the European 
Union, ed. by Baldur Thorhallsson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000).
10   The Baltic states and their region: new Europe or old?, ed. by David J. Smith (Amsterdam, 
New York: Rodopi, 2005); Bordering Russia: theory and prospects for Europe’s Baltic rim, 
ed. by Hans Moutitzen (Aldershot; Brookfield, USA: Ashgate, 1998); The Baltic Sea 
region: conflict or cooperation? Region-making, security, disarmament and conversion: 
proceedings of the TAPRI-PFK-workshop, Kiel, 6–8 December 1991, ed. by Christian 
Wellmann (Münster, Hamburg: LIT Verlag, 1992).186 Ajalooline Ajakiri, 2012,  1/2 (139/140)
between big and small states in the Baltic Sea region. According to him, 
these are, firstly, the way of explanation proceeding from the correlation 
of forces between (big) states and, secondly, one based on the theory of 
imperialism.11 In the present article I would rank both of the approaches 
(big and small states, and imperialism) among the traditional explana-
tions. In fact, the majority of researchers who focus on propounding the 
specific role of small states in international relations may be regarded as 
representatives of the traditional way. The distinction between a big and 
a small state is always connected with the context and is therefore flexible 
and relative.12 Nevertheless, one might highlight some features that pro-
vide a basis for discriminating the behaviour of small states from that of 
major powers in international relations.13 
The creation of the Baltic Entente in 1934 as internal (Baltic) policy
As mentioned above, within the confines of the traditional way of expla-
nation, the conclusion of the Baltic pact in 1934 can be explained from 
various perspectives. First, there were domestic policy reasons. In view of 
these, we may simplify the question and formally treat the Baltic Entente 
as an agreement between three presidents wielding authoritarian power. 
Chronologically, an explanation to the effect that the alliance emerged 
only thanks to authoritarian regimes would fit in well. Beginning in at 
least 1917, representatives of various parties of Estonia, Latvia, and Lith-
uania declared that their foreign policy objective was a maximally close 
cooperation between the Baltic states. The same was reiterated by the vari-
ous government coalitions throughout the 1920s, especially in Estonia and 
Latvia. Yet the establishment of the Baltic Entente was not accomplished 
until the termination of parliamentary and political parties in Estonia and 
Latvia in the spring of 1934. 
The impetus for official negotiations between the three countries came 
from a Lithuanian memorandum to Estonia and Latvia 25 April 1934, in 
11   Stability and security in the Baltic Sea region: Russian, Nordic and European aspects, 
ed. by Olav F. Knudsen (London, Portland: Frank Cass, 1999), 5.
12  Small states inside and outside the European Union: interests and policies, ed. by 
Laurent Goetschel (Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1998); Small states and the security 
challenge in the new Europe, ed. by Werner Bauwens, Armand Clesse and Olav F. 
Knudsen (London, Washington: Brassey’s, 1996); Small states in Europe and dependence, 
ed. by Otmar Höll (Wien: W. Braumüller; Laxenburg, Austria: Austrian Institute for 
International Affairs, 1983). 
13  John Rogers, “The foreign policy of small states: Sweden and the Mosul Crisis, 
1924–1925”, Contemporary European History, 16:3 (2007), 349–369.187 Eero Medijainen: The 1934 Treaty of the Baltic Entente
which a proposal for closer cooperation was made. The Estonian envoy in 
Kaunas, Johan Leppik, confirmed that he had information to assume that 
the memorandum represented “the product of the considerations of the 
Lithuanian president, which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to reckon 
with.”14 By this, the president wanted to calm the opposition, which had 
criticized Lithuania’s foreign policy pursued until then. According to the 
envoy’s information, the subject of the Baltic alliance provided an oppor-
tunity for the Lithuanian opposition to express itself. The opposition’s 
main claim was that Lithuania was exposed to the risk of isolation, which 
should be avoided. In July 1934, Leppik unequivocally stated that Lithu-
ania’s appeal to the Baltic states was a forced step for the president in the 
face of growing pressure from the opposition. According to the Estonian 
envoy in Riga, Karl Menning, Latvian president Ulmanis lacked any inter-
est in foreign policy. However, both he and Estonian President Päts were 
obviously interested in controlling the events. The three presidents were 
evidently interested in giving the impression that they were concerned 
about the security of their state and wanted to take into account the pub-
lic opinion during spring and summer 1934. 
But it is hardly likely that Päts, Ulmanis, and Smetana were fascinated 
by the plan of Ants Piip, a leading foreign policy figure, foreign minister, 
and envoy of Estonia in the period between the two world wars, which he 
propagated in Riga in 1933–34.15 Piip had been a foreign minister in the 
1920s, he represented Estonia as an envoy in London (1918–19) and Wash-
ington (1923–25). The generalization that the establishment of the Baltic 
Entente in 1934 represented the realization of an old and obscure dream, 
mainly in the heads of the politicians of the Baltic states, may condition-
ally be considered as a domestic policy.16 Attempts to build a Baltic union 
were based on the idea of Balto-Scandinavian regional cooperation pro-
posed in the days during and after the First World War, and were consist-
ent with different plans in Europe that had been put forward after the war 
to stabilize the new international situation.17 Such plans were presented at 
14   Leppik to the deputy of foreign minister, Estonian State Archives [Riigiarhiiv, 
henceforth ERA], f. 957, n. 13, s. 797. 
15   Eero Medijainen, Eesti välispoliitika Balti suund 1926–1934 (Tartu Ülikool, 1991), 38–43.
16  Kaido Jaanson, “The Baltic Sea region in international relations of the twentieth 
century: the seminal nature of the interwar period”, Journal of Baltic Studies, 32:3 (2001), 
267–288; Kaido Jaanson, “Põhjavalgus või fatamorgana? Balti-Skandinaavia liidu idee 
ja koostöö ühest suurest sõjast teiseni”, Akadeemia, 9 (1990), 1894–1904.
17   Marko Lehti, A Baltic league as a construct of the new Europe: envisioning a Baltic 
region and small state sovereignty in the aftermath of the First World War (Frankfurt 
am Main, New York: Peter Lang, 1999).188 Ajalooline Ajakiri, 2012,  1/2 (139/140)
several levels from 1917–18. Future cooperation was to resemble that of the 
British Commonwealth.18 This could embrace Estonia and Latvia or Esto-
nia, Latvia, and Finland, or even all the countries around the Baltic Sea 
(except Germany and Soviet Union). It envisaged already in 1918 that the 
Estonian-Latvian-Lithuanian alliance should be led by a joint cabinet to 
be composed of the governments of the federal states. 
Estonia had been the most active proponent of the Baltic collaboration 
since achieving independence. This was noticed even by uncommitted 
observers. For example, the envoy of the United States in the Baltic states, 
Frederik Coleman, reported on 22 April 1929 to Washington: “Estonian’s 
geographic situation makes her the most exposed of the three Baltic States 
to a sudden attack by Soviet Russia. Her exposed position has naturally 
played an important part in shaping her foreign policy. Like Latvia, Esto-
nia was strongly in favour of a Baltic League in the early days of her exist-
ence as an independent state.” By characterizing the role of other neigh-
boring states, he continued: “Lithuania has pursued a policy of complete 
aloofness from the other two Baltic States […]; Finland is clearly more 
interested in developing good relations with the Scandinavian countries 
than with Estonia.”19 
The decisive turn for the creation of Entente was connected to the 
changes in the leadership of Lithuanian foreign policy. At least two young 
officials started to play important roles in Lithuania in the 1930s. They were 
foreign minister Stasys Lozoraitis, and colonel Stasys Raštikis, who in 1934 
was appointed chief of the general staff. Raštikis repeatedly took the ini-
tiative in promoting a Baltic military alliance, but the Estonian military 
command remained modest in this direction. All attempts to improve the 
Lithuanian situation remained unrealized – or as Vytautas Žalys put it, the 
Lithuania geopolitical position was the same at the end of the 1930s as in 
previous years. To the south Lithuania had no real relations with Poland; 
in the north was the moribund Baltic Entente.20
However, can Baltic identity be correlated with some territorial aware-
ness or collective consciousness? Does it represent a territorial togetherness 
18   Eero Medijainen, “Ants Piip Eesti kohast rahvusvahelistes liitudes”, Kleio, 9 (1994), 
37–41.
19   F. W. B. Coleman to the Secretary of State, 22 April 1929, National Archives (US) 
[henceforth NA], College Park, RG 59, 760n.61/32.
20   Vytautas Žalys, “The return of Lithuania to the European stage”, Alfonsas Eidintas, 
Vytautas Žalys, Lithuania in European politics: the years the first republic, 1918–1940, 
introduction and afterword by Alfred Erich Senn, ed. by Edvardas Tuskenis (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 151–154.189 Eero Medijainen: The 1934 Treaty of the Baltic Entente
perceived by the people living in the Baltic states, and how can such a per-
ception be determined and defined? Identity can be specified in two ways, 
the most important of which is the distinction between “us and them”. We 
can distinguish internal identity and external identity (identity imposed 
by others). In the case of the Baltic states, the so-called internal common 
denominator, or “us”, seems to be quite clear in the twentieth century. The 
gaining of independence and the recognitions by other states occurred more 
or less simultaneously between 1917–22, and the official Estonian, Latvian, 
and Lithuanian delegations worked in close conjunction at the Paris Peace 
Conference in 1919, as they had a similar status and common goals. At the 
Paris Peace Conference, the issues of the Baltic states were discussed in 
a joint committee, although often in the context of the whole of Eastern 
Europe and Russia. The older European countries granted their official de 
jure recognition of the Baltic states after the latter had concluded peace trea-
ties with Russia in 1920. Nevertheless, the ranking of Lithuania as a Baltic 
state following World War I was not very common; formal United States 
documents used the term “Lithuania and the Baltic provinces of Russia”.21 
At the same time, one cannot confirm that the unity between the Bal-
tic states emerged during these simultaneous fights for their independ-
ence and for recognition by the great powers in Europe and the United 
States. There are in-depth analyses of the problems related to the grant-
ing of recognition to the Baltic states by Finland and the Scandinavian 
countries. But those recognitions were given separately to Estonia, Lat-
via, and Lithuania, and not commonly to the Baltic states. Similarly, the 
most voluminous research to date on the issue of the United States de jure 
is a monograph published in 1965 by Albert N. Tarulis, a scholar of Lithu-
anian extraction.22 He primarily portrays the internal pressure exerted on 
the State Department by the so-called Baltic people using various levers 
and levels for the purpose of obtaining recognition and the right to desig-
nate diplomatic and consular representatives. On the contrary to Tarulis, 
Constantine R. Jurgela approached to the same topic as a special Lithua-
nian case study.23 He estimated highly the pressure placed on United States 
president Harding by the Lithuanian-American community, but seems to 
21   Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States, 191, vol. II (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, United States Department of State, 1919), 666–674.
22   Albert N. Tarulis, American-Baltic relations, 1918–1922: the struggle over recognition 
(Washington: The Catolic University of America Press, 1965).
23   Constantine R. Jurgela, Lithuania and the United States: the establishment of state 
relations (Chicago: Lihuanian Historical Society, The Lithuanian Research and Studies 
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avoid the fact that recognition was given simultaneously to all three Bal-
tic states. He and Alfonsas Eidintas pointed out the role of different Lithu-
anian émigré institutions and their activity in achieving the recognition 
for Lithuania in 1922.24 
From the point of view of Lithuania, it was understandable that they 
wanted to depict the process of receiving independence as a restoration 
of the old, historical statehood. Lithuanian political leaders believed that 
Lithuania had ancient state traditions, and the status of Lithuania differed 
from Estonia and Latvia under international law. Estonia and Latvia were 
new states that based their status mainly on the comparatively new prin-
ciple of national self-determination. Some political leaders believed that 
Lithuania could retain its independence when Russia sooner or later sought 
to regain a Baltic window through Estonia and Latvia.25 Ironically, the de 
jure recognition of Latvia and Estonia by the European powers more than 
a year before Lithuania’s recognition, and simultaneous de jure recognition 
by the United States in 1922, proved that this was a baseless hope.
The agreement on political cooperation concluded in Warsaw in April 
1922 (Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Finland) was not ratified by Finland.26 By 
the end of 1923, only the Estonian-Latvian defence pact was formalized, 
yet subsequently only minimal efforts were made to actually implement 
it. The main result of the economic cooperation efforts was the Estonian-
Latvian customs union agreement, concluded also in 1923, which soon was 
reduced to bilateral trade agreements. In these, the so-called Baltic res-
ervation was used in the trade treaties of the Baltic states until the 1930s. 
In principle, this allowed mutual fringe benefits, yet in practice minimal 
use was made of this opportunity. The critical impetus to realize the Bal-
tic Entente came from outside these countries and was first and foremost 
related to the signing of the non-aggression pact between Poland and Ger-
many on 26 January 1934. 
24   Alfonsas Eidintas, Lithuanian emigration to the United States 1868–1950 (Vilnius: 
Mokslo ir enciklopedijų leidybos institutas, 2003), 115–146. 
25   Vytautas Žalys, “The Era of Ultimatums”, Alfonsas Eidintas, Vytautas Zalys, Lithuania 
in European politics: the years the first republic, 1918–1940, introduction and afterword by 
Alfred Erich Senn, ed. by Edvardas Tuskenis (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 100.
26   Heikki Roikko-Jokela, Ihanteita ja reaalipolitiikkaa: Rudolf Holstin toiminta Baltian 
maiden kansainvälisen de jure-tunnustamisen ja reunavaltioyhteistyön puolesta 1918–1922, 
Studia Historica Jyväskyläensia, 52 (Jyväskylä: Jyväskylän yliopisto, 1995).191 Eero Medijainen: The 1934 Treaty of the Baltic Entente
Creation of the Baltic Entente from the point of view 
of international relations
If the emphasis is on the primacy of foreign policy, the establishment of 
the Baltic Entente can be explained by external factors. Accordingly, the 
Baltic states became active with the formal warm-up in Polish-German 
relations in 1933–34. In this particular case, it is not important to address 
the reasons that prompted the signing of the non-aggression declaration 
on 26 January 1934. The declaration has been considered a sign of Poland’s 
foreign policy coming to a crossroads, and opinions differ as to its conse-
quences.27 One of the consequences was growing unease in Kaunas and 
their appeal to northern neighbors Latvia and Estonia. 
Apart from the rapprochement between Poland and Germany, however, 
consideration must be given to even more significant changes. The Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs of Estonia Julius Seljamaa notified the envoys in his 
letter of 16 April 1934 that while the Baltic states were unable to previously 
undertake any joint actions, now the Soviet Union practically invited them 
to these. In March 1934 the foreign ministers and top brass of Estonia, Lat-
via, and Lithuania were requested to visit the Soviet Union at the same time. 
In the Baltic capitals, the Soviet representatives hinted off the record that 
Moscow expected friendlier relations and did not even rule out the estab-
lishment of Red Army military bases in the Baltic states.28 The establish-
ment of the Baltic Entente materialized after the Soviet Union’s leadership 
(the Politbureau) decided in 1934 to start supporting mutual cooperation 
between the Baltic states.29 Moscow was interested in establishing a buffer 
zone between Russia and Germany, and tried to prevent the Baltic states 
from falling under the influences of Poland or Germany. 
Hugh I. Rodgers, who has written a thorough study of the history of 
the establishment of the Baltic Entente, deemed Estonia and Latvia as los-
ers in international relations as they had developed by August 1934. With 
Moscow’s blessing, however, they came together in Riga and formalized 
the Baltic Entente agreement. The ceremonial signing of the agreement was 
27   Piotr Stefan Wandycz, The twilight of French eastern alliances, 1926–1936. French-
Czechoslovak-Poland relations from Locarno to the remilitarization of the Rheineland 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 300–335. 
28   Esmo Ridala, “Peajooni Eesti välispoliitikast 1934–1940”, Eesti Teadusliku Seltsi Rootsis 
Aastaraamat, Annales VIII, 1977–1979 (Stockholm: Norstedts Tryckeri, 1980), 37–60; 
Heinrich Laretei, Saatuse mängukanniks: mällu jäänud märkmeid (Tallinn: Tallinna 
Raamatutrükikoda, 1992).
29   Jelena Zubkova, Baltimaad ja Kreml, 1940–1953 (Tallinn: Varrak, 2007), 21–22.192 Ajalooline Ajakiri, 2012,  1/2 (139/140)
deferred to the time of the League of Nations assembly in Geneva scheduled 
for September 1934. According to Rodgers, the agreement was inappropri-
ate for justifying the pious sermons on the unity and solidarity of the Bal-
tics held in the subsequent years. The Baltic states were not completely free 
by signing the Entente agreement. In his opinion, the agreement of 1934 
was even weaker than the so-called Buldur Agreement concluded 14 years 
previously (a non-ratified treaty, concluded in October 1920 near Riga), 
and thus the Baltic states emerged from the great diplomatic whirlwind of 
1933–34 with nothing gained.30 The same conclusion had been reached by 
American representatives in the Baltic states by the middle of 1930s. The 
American minister in Riga, consuls (in Tallinn and Kaunas), and the offi-
cial staff of legation discussed the recent developments in the Baltic states 
on 12 June 1937. They agreed with the minister Arthur B. Lane’s conclusion 
that the Baltic Entente seemed to be nothing but a convenient expression 
without any practical significance.31
Broader context of the treaty
When analyzing the context of the conclusion of the Baltic Entente, the 
attempt to establish a collective security system in Eastern and Central 
Europe in the first half of the 1930s must be considered a significant exter-
nal factor. Namely, the Baltic Entente can be treated as an organic part of 
an even wider political confederacy, which in the history of international 
relations is known as the Eastern Pact. The Eastern Pact, or the Eastern 
Locarno Pact, was intended to conclude a mutual assistance agreement 
between the Soviet Union, France, Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland. The reawakening of the old East-
ern Pact plan started with the warming of relations between the Soviet 
Union and France in 1931–32.32 This plan underwent several development 
stages within a few years. It took into account the principles of the League 
of Nations and ideas of regional collective security. The Baltic states saw the 
actual version of the agreement only in the summer of 1934. In the spring 
and summer of 1934, talks were held about the different textual versions 
30  Hugh I. Rodgers, Search for security: a study in the Baltic diplomacy, 1920–1934 
(Hamden: Archon Books, 1975), 102.
31  Arthur Bliss Lane to the Secretary of State, 26 June 1937, NA RG 84, Riga, Latvia 
Legation & Consulate 1937, 127 (610.12).
32   William Ewans Scott, Alliance against Hitler (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
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of the Eastern Pact. One of the major faults of the planned agreement was 
the uncertainty about the number of the possible participants. Thus, ini-
tially France was not even willing to accede to the agreement but rather 
wanted to take the role of intermediary or guarantor. 
One point was clear from the beginning, however. In all the versions of 
the prospective agreement, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were considered 
as a unified whole, as the Baltic region or area, the security of which the 
bigger neighbours were to guarantee. But it was not clear whether Finland 
belonged to the Baltic states or not, though Helsinki’s pursuit was to dis-
tance itself in every way possible from the Baltic states and from the East-
ern Pact. Therefore the Baltic region needed to be defined in more detail 
for political and agreement-related purposes. Formally, the Baltic Entente 
signed in September 1934 was an open agreement – that is, open for other 
countries to join (although no one planned to do so). The most important 
outcome of the agreement was that it helped to consolidate the view that 
politically, in terms of international relations, the Baltic states comprised 
only Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 
In summary, it may be said that pursuant to the traditional way of expla-
nation, the Baltic states developed cooperation between themselves pro-
ceeding from practical political considerations. Through such cooperation, 
they hoped to be more successful in their dealings with bigger states and 
in international organizations. However, the activity of the Baltic Entente 
from 1934–40 is ultimately judged a failure, since the pact was unable to 
enhance the security of its member countries and did not avert their loss 
of independence. As a rule, practical politics are given as reasons for the 
failure of the cooperation, including the fact that the persons and depart-
ments dealing with the foreign and security policy of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania had differing views on principal dangers and priorities. 
Ilmar Tõnisson and evaluation of the Baltic Entente
Fairly widespread in the literature covering the actions of the Baltic Entente 
is the persistent pursuit to lay the blame for failure of the pact on one or 
the other party, most often on Estonia. With the shelving of the plans for 
the Eastern Pact in 1935–36, the major powers of Europe (Germany, France, 
the Soviet Union) lost interest in utilizing the Baltic Entente for the pur-
poses of the planned pact. Furthermore, it opened the door for disagree-
ments between the Baltic states. Friedrich Akel, who become the Minister 
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the top brass of the Estonian military (J. Laidoner, N. Reek, V. Saarsen, R. 
Maasing) were considered by their Latvian counterparts to be too friendly 
to both Poland and Germany. The same has been persistently reiterated by 
Edgar Anderson, a United States historian of Latvian descent,33 as well as 
by those investigating the history of Latvian foreign policy in the 1990s.34 
Occasionally there have even been conspiracy speculations to the effect that 
Estonia deliberately prevented the establishment of a Baltic defence alliance. 
As proof, the position is presented that a German orientation prevailed in 
Estonian foreign policy in the 1930s, and since Berlin was not interested 
in a Baltic defence alliance, it was thwarted with the help of Estonia’s pro-
German politicians and military officers.35 
One of the most influential foreign policy manifestos on the question of 
the Baltic Entente is deemed to be the writing of Ilmar Tõnisson, son of one 
of Estonia’s best-known politicians Jaan Tõnisson, in the periodical Aka-
deemia, which was published in Tartu and in the context of the “silent era” 
of the 1930s. The article was issued in 1937 in two editions of the journal.36 
In his study, Ilmar Tõnisson denied the unity of Baltic space and destiny. 
He considered it to be a figment of the imaginations of primarily Latvian 
politicians and intellectuals and of Baltic Germans. According to his vision, 
Estonia had to abandon the idea of a Baltic alliance and collective security 
and to turn Finland and Scandinavia. Contemporary Latvian politicians, 
diplomats, and some later historians did not preclude the possibility that 
Ilmar Tõnisson had been bought off by means of a state grant and the arti-
cle represented his attempt to please governmental circles. Namely, Tõnis-
son’s studies in Europe, mainly in Britain, in the 1930s were supported by 
a state grant. He was a talented young man whose intellectual potential, 
unfortunately, could not be converted to the common good as he was shot 
by his wife in 1939. Ilmar Tõnisson did not have time to publish much, yet 
33   Edgar Anderson, “Toward the Baltic Union 1920–1927”, Lituanus, XII (1966); Edgar 
Anderson, “Toward the Baltic Union 1927–1934”, Lituanus, XIII (1967); Edgar Anderson, 
“The Baltic Entente: phantom or reality?”, The Baltic states in peace and war 1917–1945, 
ed. by V. Stanley Vardys, Romuald J. Misiunas (London, Pennsylvavia: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1978); Edgar Anderson, “The Baltic Entente 1914–1940? Its strength 
and weakness”, The Baltic in international relations between the two World Wars, ed. by 
John Hiden and Aleksander Loit, Studia Baltica Stockholmiensia, 3, Acta Universitatis 
Stockholmiensis (Stockholm: Stockholms Universitet, 1988).
34   Feldmanis, Stranga, The destiny of the Baltic Entente, 89–92.
35   Magnus Ilmjärv, Nõukogude Liidu ja Saksamaa vahel: Balti riigid ja Soome 1934–1940 
(Tallinn: Eesti Teaduste Akadeemia, 1993), 49–50.
36  Ilmar Tõnisson, “Eesti välispoliitika”, I–II, Akadeemia, 3 (1937), 155–179; 6 (1937), 
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his influence on Estonian political thinking was noticeable.37 In the opin-
ion of some historians, the views expressed in the aforementioned article 
coincided with the foreign policy views of Estonia’s political leadership.38 
It is fairly obvious that the publication of such writing in Estonia in 
1937 cannot be seen merely as an attempt to undermine or even destroy 
the questionable sense of Baltic unity or identity. It did not represent a plot 
prepared by the government circles of Estonia to show that they had the 
opposition’s support for their German-friendly foreign policy. Neither was 
it a strategic scheme to split the opposition politicians in Estonia. Such a 
speculation could be raised, though, as Ants Piip, a lawyer as well as a for-
mer diplomat and foreign minister who was counted among the opposition, 
published an article to counter Tõnisson. It was written along traditional 
lines and confirmed that Estonia definitely belonged to the Baltic states 
and that claims to the contrary were inappropriate and even malevolent. 
I propose a hypothesis that Tõnisson’s article represented a geopoliti-
cal understanding and explanation of the Baltic states in international 
relations. The article shows that a new way of assessing international rela-
tions was gaining ground in Estonia in the 1930s. Now it has reached the 
point where we view this as the natural or only way of thinking about the 
place of the Baltic states in international relations. Calls for Baltic unity 
are as old as the Baltic states themselves and rest on the so-called geo-
political logic.39 The geopolitical way of thinking appears to be a fairly 
common way to characterize cooperation between the Baltic states in the 
twentieth century. Geopolitics as an independent school for understand-
ing international relations was born in the late nineteenth century. In the 
context of the 1930s, however, it was a modern way of thinking. First and 
foremost, we must take into account influences from Karl Haushofer and 
his students and colleagues. Haushofer considered the conclusion of the 
Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact in August 1939 to be the ultimate ful-
filment of his theory in the form of the emergence of the Germany-Rus-
sia-Japan alliance.40 Such a “geopolitical logic” was opposed by research-
ers of political geography in England, France, and the United States. The 
37   Ilmar Tõnisson, Emajõe ääres, ed. by Hando Runnel (Tartu: Ilmamaa, 1997).
38   Ilmjärv, Nõukogude Liidu ja Saksamaa vahel, 51.
39   Atis Lejiņš, “The quest for Baltic unity: chimera or reality?” Small states in a turbulent 
environment: the Baltic perspective, ed. by Atis Lejiņš and Žaneta Ozoliņa (Riga: Latvian 
Institute of International Affairs, 1997), 148.
40  Holger H. Herwig, “Geopolitik: Haushofer, Hitler and Lebensraum”, Geopolitics, 
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Anglo-Saxon and French scientists dealing with geopolitics countered the 
German school with writings that emphasized national interests. In their 
opinion, the German Geopolitik was quite clearly in the service of Nazi 
ideology and politics.41 
The article by Tõnisson in Akadeemia in 1937 was the first writing in 
Estonia that employed the method of explaining international relations 
primarily through the geopolitical aspect. This accounts for his position 
that the Baltics constituted neither some natural, determinate whole nor 
a unified region, and for his suggestions to choose a different direction 
for Estonia’s foreign policy. In his opinion, it was in Estonian national 
interests to come closer to Scandinavia. Whether and to what extent the 
Baltic states’ political and military leadership conceived of international 
relations in geopolitical terms in the 1930s requires further research. Even 
if that was the case, the article by Tõnisson proves that apart from influ-
ences from the German school, ideas of a different origin were making 
inroads into the Baltic states. The publication of such writing in Estonia 
in 1937 cannot be seen merely as an attempt to undermine or even destroy 
the questionable sense of Baltic unity or identity. Is it possible to pinpoint 
some “unity of Baltic space and destiny”, the lack of which in the 1930s is 
blamed on Estonia? 
The issue of identity has found its way into international relations as a 
relatively new trend. Identity is first and foremost associated with social 
integrity or cohesion in society. If we assume that the state is the central 
factor in international relations, identity can be found either within the 
state or in a superstructure encompassing more than one state. In the case 
of the Baltics, is there indeed a regional identity uniting the three nations? 
There is no doubt that some kind of Baltic identity exists, and it can be 
described scientifically. “Baltic” or “Baltic states” (Baltikum) can be clas-
sified in a number of ways. “Baltic” can denote various fields of activity, 
people, institutions, processes, individual historical facts, events that are in 
some way connected to the Baltic states becoming re-independent in 1991. 
A separate larger group of works can be identified, which are devoted to 
the search for a content-related common denominator, a common history, a 
common identity, or even an attempt to form such an identity. Discussions 
on Baltic identity became especially lively in connection with the restora-
tion of the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and the increase 
in the interest of researchers and historians in the region everywhere in 
41   Geoffrey Parker, Geopolitics: past, present and future (London, Washington: Pinter, 
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Europe. There was an attempt to give the region an historical justification 
through the writing of a new Baltic history.42 
In spite of tense cooperation between the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithu-
anian government institutions and NGOs, we have no public polls or other 
sources available to allow us to assert that the citizens of Estonia, Latvia, or 
Lithuania perceived themselves as part of some common territorial unit – 
e.g. as citizens of the Baltic states – prior to World War II. Such polls were 
never conducted, despite the fact that there was close communication both 
at the official state level and unofficially. Nor have any surveys of public 
opinion or regional awareness on the corresponding subject been performed 
after the regaining of independence in 1991. A shared sense of threat may 
be the backbone of cooperation on security and defence between the Bal-
tic states.43 Yet it is doubtful whether that would be enough to ascertain 
an internal, common identity and a sense of unity. 
Conclusions
The most common way to answer the question of why the Baltic states coop-
erated between themselves in the first half of the twentieth century, and 
still do, is to use the traditional way of explanation, especially where the 
cooperation is primarily viewed in an external security-related context. It 
is complicated to explain the belonging of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
to some independent, united entity using the concept of identity. We have 
to take into account external identity imposed by “them” as an important 
factor calling for some sort of joint action. At the same time, it is not pos-
sible to ascertain a Baltic identity that is internal and based on an “us” con-
sciousness. We have no grounds to talk about some generally recognized, 
understandable-to-all specifics that bind the Baltic states together. It may 
be assumed that the emphatic statements on Baltic identity are built on 
rather speculative arguments. At any rate, the notion of “Baltic states” has 
not come about by virtue of some internal “us” awareness, but rather rep-
resents a conviction that a Baltic identity exists that is conditioned first and 
foremost by external factors. Such a conviction can be ascertained under 
certain circumstances, that is, in a security-related context, as an external 
42   Andres Kasekamp, A history of the Baltic states (Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010).
43   Mare Haab, “Potentials and vulnerabilities of the Baltic states: mutual competition 
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phenomenon only, but it hardly extends to cultural or economic unity, and 
definitely not to linguistic or religious unity.
Eero Medijainen (b. 1959), Ph.D., Professor of Contemporary History, Univer-
sity of Tartu.
Kokkuvõte: Balti liidu (1934) tõlgendusi
Kuivõrd ja millega on õigustatud Eesti, Läti ja Leedu kuulumist min-
gisse iseseisvasse, ühtsesse tervikusse? Kas meil on alust rääkida mingist 
üldtunnustatud, kõigile arusaadavast eripärast, mis Balti riike omavahel 
ühendab? Üheks taoliseks ühendavaks faktiks peetakse asjaolu, et Eesti, 
Läti ja Leedu kirjutasid 12. septembril 1934. aastal Genfis alla üksmeele ja 
koostöö lepingule. See nägi ette regulaarseid kokkusaamisi välisminist-
rite tasemel. Kuue aasta jooksul (1934–40) toimus 11 kolmepoolset välis-
ministrite kohtumist. 
Nn Balti Antandi loomise näol 1934. aastal oli tegemist vana ja peami-
selt Balti riikide poliitikute peades ringelnud ebamäärase unistuse reali-
seerimisega. Balti liidu (union) loomise katsed toetusid Esimese maail-
masõja päevil ja järel pakutud ideele Balti ja Skandinaavia regionaalsest 
koostööst ja need haakusid erinevate kavadega Euroopas, mis maailmasõja 
järel pakuti uue rahvusvahelise olukorra stabiliseerimiseks. Balti Antanti 
reeglina sõjaliste kaitseliitude hulka ei liigitata. 1930. aastate teisel poolel 
jäi Balti liidu laiendamine sõjaliseks paktiks vaid teoreetiliseks ja mitte 
reaalpoliitiliseks võimaluseks. 
Välispoliitika primaarsust rõhutades saab Balti kolmikliidu loomist 
seletada väliste mõjutegurite abil. Nii muutusid Balti riigid aktiivseks koos 
Poola ja Saksamaa suhete formaalse soojenemisega 1933.–34. aastal. Otsus-
tav tõuge liidu realiseerimiseks tuli väljastpoolt ja oli esmajoones seotud 
Poola ja Saksamaa mittekallaletungilepingu allakirjutamisega 26. jaanua-
ril 1934. Lisaks võib kinnitada, et Balti Antant realiseerus pärast seda, kui 
Nõukogude Liidu juhtkonnas (poliitbüroos) otsustati 1934. aastal hakata 
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Balti liidu sõlmimise tausta avades tuleb oluliseks väliseks teguriks 
pidada 1930. aastatel tehtud katset rajada Ida- ja Kesk-Euroopas kollektiiv-
set julgeolekusüsteemi. Nimelt saab Balti Antanti käsitleda kui loomulikku 
osa veel laiemast poliitilisest ühendusest, mida tuntakse rahvusvaheliste 
suhete ajaloos Ida-pakti nime all. Ida-pakti ehk 1920. aastate teisest poo-
lest pärit nimetusega Ida-Locarno lepingu all mõeldi kava sõlmida vas-
tastikuse abistamise leping Nõukogude Liidu, Prantsusmaa, Saksamaa, 
Poola, Tšehhoslovakkia, Leedu, Läti, Eesti ja Soome vahel. Lepingupro-
jekti juuri tuleb otsida aastatel 1931–32 alanud Nõukogude Liidu ja Prant-
susmaa lähenemisest ning see kava tegi mõne aasta jooksul läbi mitu aren-
gujärku. Idee pidi teostuma Rahvasteliidu põhimõtteid ja regionaalseid 
kollektiivse julgeoleku ideid arvestades. Lepingu lõplikku versiooni Balti 
riigid ei näinud ning projektist kaugemale ulatuvat tulemust algatusel ei 
olnudki. 1934. aasta kevadel ja suvel käisid läbirääkimised Ida-pakti teksti 
erinevate versioonide üle. 
Balti Antandi tegevust aastatel 1934–40 hinnatakse reeglina ebaõn-
nestunuks, sest ühendus ei suutnud suurendada sinna kuuluvate riikide 
julgeolekut ega hoidnud ära iseseisvuse kaotamist. Koostöö nurjumise 
põhjuseid otsitakse reeglina samuti reaalpoliitilistest argumentidest. Kõi-
gepealt sellest, et Eesti, Läti ja Leedu välis- ja julgeolekupoliitikaga tege-
levatel inimestel ja ametkondadel olid arusaamad peamistest ohtudest ja 
prioriteetidest erinevad. Kõik kolm riiki lootsid Balti Antandi abil saavu-
tada erinevaid välispoliitilisi eesmärke. 
Artikkel käsitleb muuhulgas Eesti ühe tuntuima poliitiku, Jaan Tõnis-
soni poja Ilmar Tõnissoni kirjutist 1930. aastate “vaikiva ajastu” konteks-
tis opositsioonilises väljaandes Akadeemia. Tõnisson eitas oma uurimu-
ses Balti ruumi ja saatuse ühtsust, ta pidas seda peamiselt Läti poliitikute, 
haritlaste ja baltisakslaste muinasjutuks. Tema arvates pidi Eesti loobuma 
Balti liidust ja kollektiivse julgeoleku ideest ning orienteeruma neutralitee-
dile ja Soomele ja Skandinaaviale. Mõned ajaloolased ei välista võimalust, 
et artikli näol oli tegemist riikliku stipendiumi abil ära ostetud Tõnissoni 
katsega meeldida Eesti valitsusringkondadele. Sellise kirjutise avalda-
mist Eestis 1937. aastal ei saa paraku hinnata vaid kui katset õõnestada 
või koguni lõhkuda küsitavat Balti ühtsustunnet või identiteeti. Tegemist 
ei olnud Eesti valitsusringkondade poolt ettevalmistatud salaplaaniga, et 
leida opositsiooni näilist toetust oma nn saksasõbralikule välispoliitikale. 
Samuti mitte strateegilise salaplaaniga killustada Eestis opositsioonis ole-
vaid poliitikuid. Käesolev artikkel lähtub hüpoteesist, et Tõnissoni kirjutis 
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mis kasutas 1920.–30. aastatel Euroopas levinud meetodit seletada rahvus-
vahelisi suhteid eelkõige läbi geopoliitilise aspekti. 